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"I was elected in 1916 because Woodrow Wilson kept us out of
war-I was defeated in 1920 because Woodrow Wilson hadn't kept
us out of war."1 So claimed Judge Fred Williams of the Missouri
Supreme Court long ago.2 As early as 1821, Justice Joseph Story ar-
gued against a perceived trend toward elective judiciaries; and in
1906, Roscoe Pound said elective judiciaries were undermining judi-
cial legitimacy.3 Later, in 1913, William Howard Taft argued that
the remedy of nonpartisan elections actually made the problem of
elective judiciaries worse. He believed it would allow unqualified
candidates who lacked the support of their political parties to get
elected.4
While political party involvement in judicial elections has long
had its detractors, there are positive statements that can be made. For
example, political parties may provide campaign workers for judicial
candidates. They can also help provide campaign funding. In fact,
according to the September 2000 campaign reports made in the Ala-
bama chief justice's race, the largest donor to the Democratic
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1. PHILIP L. DUBOIs, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND
THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILrrY 7 (1980) [hereinafter DuBOiS, FROM
BALLOT TO BENCH].
2. See id. at258 n.12.
3. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries
and the Rule ofLaw, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689,723 (1995).
4. See id. at 724.
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candidate for chief justice was the Democratic Party.5 Most impor-
tantly, the party label provides a significant political asset for candi-
dates in low visibility races such as judicial races. And for voters,
the party label is a crucial source of information. As Professor Philip
Dubois wrote,
[V]oters' reliance on the partisan label choices is, in a very
real sense, a rational act. This is no less true in judicial
elections.... Thus, research has repeatedly demonstrated
that where the partisan cue is available, judicial voters will
rely upon it. The availability of the party label both
prompts voters to exercise a choice, thereby increasing the
percentage of the eligible electorate. participating in the
election, and results in the expression in the aggregate of
the voters' preferences for the direction ofjudicial policy.
6
The party label provides a clue to the attitudes and values of
judges and ultimately to how they might decide questions of public
policy that are presented in their courts. One recent analysis of 140
articles written on the link between judges' party affiliations and per-
formance on the bench confirmed that "party is a dependable meas-
ure of ideology on modem American courts. '' 7  Party affiliation,
however, as an indicator of judicial ideology is not uniform across
the states. In a study of workers' compensation appeals decided by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court over a ten year period, David Ada-
many found some correlation between the party affiliation of the jus-
tices and their votes in favor or against claimants, but the correlation
was less than that found in Michigan. Adamany believed differences
in partisanship of judicial campaigns in the two states, and thus
5. See Stan Bailey, Moore's War Chest Doubles Yates, BIRMINGHAM
NEWS, Sept. 26, 2000, available at http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/
Sep2000/26-e422646b.html. A spokesman for the Alabama Citizens for a
Sound Economy, a pro-business organization, claims that trial lawyers will
give about two million dollars to the State Democratic Executive Committee
and about one million of that sum will go to judges. See Stan Bailey, Bench
Hopefuls Get Lawyers'Donations, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Oct. 6, 2000.
6. Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of
State Judges: The Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 Sw. L.J. 31, 44
(1986).
7. Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American
Courts: A Meta-analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 243 (1999).
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differences in the states' political cultures, explained the discrepan-
cies in the correlations.8 Another study of partisan voting on eight
state courts concluded: "Where judges are selected in highly partisan
circumstances and depend upon a highly partisan constituency for
continuance in office, they may act in ways which will cultivate sup-
port for that constituency, that is, exhibit partisan voting tendencies
in their judicial decision making."
9
Of course, just as there is value in party label voting, there is
also a downside. Highly qualified judicial candidates can be de-
feated simply because, in a particular election year, they bear the
wrong party label. After Republican straight ticket voting led to the
defeat of nineteen Democratic judges in Harris County (Houston),
Texas and led to Republican victories in forty-one of forty-two con-
tested judicial races, one law school dean commented: "[I]fBozo the
Clown had been running as a Republican against any Democrat, he
would have had a chance."' 0 Similarly, while the parties can help
provide funding for judicial campaigns, in some places funding ar-
rangements are the reverse. Judges are required to contribute money
to their party in order to secure the party's endorsement in the gen-
eral election. 11 Such endorsement payments have been made in New
8. See David W. Adamany, The Party Variable in Judges' Voting: Con-
ceptual Notes and a Case Study, 63 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 57 (1969).
9. DuBois, FROM BALLOTTO BENCH, supra note I, at 148.
10. Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of
Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital
Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 760, 780 (1995).
11. See Scott D. Wiener, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and Pro-
cedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 196 (1996). The Cook
County Democratic Party requires all slated candidates, including judicial can-
didates, to contribute money for printing and mailing campaign literature. See
Aaron Chambers, How High the Bar?, ILL. IssuEs 14, 19 (2000), available at
http://illinoisissues.uis.edubar.html. Marlene Arnold Nicholson and Bradley
Scott Weiss found that Republican judicial candidates also gave money to
party committees in Cook County. They believed, "The standard sums given
by partisan judicial candidates appear to be assessments that are necessary for
obtaining a place on the party slates." Marlene A. Nicholson & Bradley S.
Weiss, Funding Judicial Campaigns in the Circuit Court of Cook County, 70
JUDICATURE 17, 24 (1986). In 1982, the Brooklyn Democratic Party chairman
rejected an offer from the Republican Party to endorse seven Democratic can-
didates running for newly created judicial seats. The offer was declined be-
cause a cross-endorsement would have eliminated the incentive for the candi-
dates to fund raise and campaign for the rest of the ticket. Without cross-
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York City; Cook County, Illinois; Philadelphia; Delaware County,
Pennsylvania; and no doubt in many other jurisdictions. The extent
of political party contributions to judicial campaigns is limited in
some regions of the country. A study of thirty-five competitive
Pennsylvania Supreme Court elections from 1979-1997 found that
only 3.1% of contributions over fifty dollars came from political
party committees. 12
In addition, sometimes the parties routinely expect a high level
of party loyalty from their judicial nominees. In the 1970s, for ex-
ample, when the Supreme Court of Michigan decided a state redis-
tricting case favoring the Republican Party, the Democratic chief
justice was denied nomination for the 1976 election. The state bar,
however, rallied to support him, and he won the reelection as an in-
dependent. 13
In the early 1990s, the Illinois Supreme Court first rejected a re-
districting plan favorable to Republicans by a four to three party line
vote. After some minor changes were made in the plan, one of the
Democratic justices switched sides and voted with the three Republi-
can justices to uphold the plan. A Democratic legislator alleged that
the Democratic justice's vote change had been for political reasons,
but the court rejected the legislator's allegations. One justice, how-
ever, dissented. He acknowledged that party line voting occurred in
political cases, and he pointed out that the Democratic justice who
had switched his vote had plans to run for the Illinois Supreme Court
in 1992 as a Republican.14
Party label is also an imperfect indicator of the ideology of judi-
cial candidates. In states that have moved from one party's control
to the other's control, judges often switch parties in order to retain
their offices. The attitudes and values of the judges do not change-
only the party label.
endorsement, funds raised by the judicial candidates would be diverted to the
Brooklyn Democratic organization campaign for use by all Democratic candi-
dates. See Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing: Are State
Judges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes ofAmerican Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL.
57, 65 (1985).
12. See James Eisenstein, Financing Pennsylvania's Supreme Court Candi-
dates, 84 JUDICATURE 10, 15 (2000).
13. See Wiener, supra note 11, at 196.
14. See Jackson Williams, Irreconcilable Principles: Law, Politics, and the
Illinois Supreme Court, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 267, 285-87 (1998).
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Indeed, Philip Dubois' highly regarded book, From Ballot to
Bench, published in 1980, is the classic defense of partisan elections
and the importance of parties as an indication of the values ofjudges.
Dubois excluded the South from his analysis because the Republican
Party was then so insignificant in most Southern states that study of
party competition there would have been futile. In recent years,
however, the Republican Party has shown such growth in the South
that partisanship has become especially important in the study of
Southern judicial elections.
Voters can best use party affiliations as a predictor of the atti-
tudes and values of judges when appellate court elections are in-
volved. It is there that major policy questions are more likely to be
decided than in trial courts, where more routine legal issues will be
handled.
Keeping in mind that parties can and do play an important and
even positive role in funding judicial elections, mobilizing voters,
and providing cues or hints to voters about the policy preferences of
judicial candidates, there are nevertheless some serious concerns
about some of the involvement of parties in judicial elections. The
problems of partisanship that led to the creation of nonpartisan and
"Missouri Plan" systems ofjudicial selection are still with us.'
5
1I. PARTISAN ELECrIONS: JUST WHAT THE NAME SAYS
Of the seventeen states with partisan judicial elections, five are
Southern and until recently were one-party Democratic states. 16 At
least for those five states, the judges were Democrats, and if there
was any real competition in the judicial races, it was in the Demo-
15. See generally, Michael Wallace, The Case for Partisan Judicial Elec-
tions, at http://www.fed-soc.org/judicialelections.html (last visited Feb. 22,
2001) (discussing problems that eventually led to the creation of the Missouri
Plan where a panel of lawyers and lay persons suggest appointments for judi-
cial vacancies to the governor).
16. States with partisan judicial elections are Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Caro-
lina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia. However, Michigan,
Ohio, and Idaho should be added to that list. While these three states have a
nonpartisan ballot, judicial candidates run as partisan candidates. The five
Southern states on this list that were once one-party Democratic states are Ala-
bama, Arkansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas.
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cratic primary. Republican challenges were hopeless and exceed-
ingly rare. That began to change in the South during the 1970s and
1980s when the Republican Party rapidly gained strength. The expe-
rience of partisan elections in North Carolina is illustrative.17 Ap-
pellate and general jurisdiction judges were elected statewide and
were usually initially appointed to the bench by Democratic gover-
nors. The expectation was that incumbent judges would time their
resignations or retirements at some point during their terms so that
the governor could appoint a successor. However, as the Republican
Party gained strength and elected governors in 1972, 1984, and 1988,
the path to a judgeship became less clear. Incumbent Democratic
judges began to retire at the end of their terms in greater numbers
and the Democratic legislature began to create judgeships that were
filled by election rather than appointment when Republican gover-
nors were in office.
18
By 1986, there were strong partisan battles for the state supreme
court. These battles were joined by interest groups, such as the Citi-
zens for a Conservative Court, that ran advertisements critical of one
of the justice's decisions in capital murder cases and sponsored news
conferences with families of murder victims who condemned the
justice's decisions. And the stridency of the 1986 elections contin-
ued. In 1990, the Republican state chairman made television adver-
tisements criticizing the Democratic court for being soft on crime
and unduly supportive of civil plaintiffs. The Republican governor
joined the chairman. 19 Partisanship had come to judicial elections in
North Carolina as it came to the rest of the South that for years had
actually had nonpartisan elections under the fagade of a partisan
system.
In partisan elections, judicial candidates run under a party label.
The effect in competitive races is that low visibility races such as ju-
dicial races benefit (or suffer) from voting for candidates at the top of
the ticket. In Texas, Democratic judicial candidates clearly benefited
in 1982 from the popularity of Democratic U.S. Senator Lloyd
17. See James C. Drennan, Judicial Reform in North Carolina, in JUDICIAL
REFORM IN THE STATES 19, 27 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds.,
1993) [hereinafter Drennan, Judicial Reform].
18. See id. at 27.
19. See id. at 19-49
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Bentsen. Furthermore, in 1984, Republican judicial candidates bene-
fited from the presidential candidacy of Ronald Reagan.2 °
It is the party label rather than the ability of the judicial candi-
date that often determines the outcome of an election. In 1994, for
example, the former chairman of the state Republican Party called on
Republicans to take control of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
after the reversal of a capital conviction. The Democratic incumbent
was a conservative former prosecutor who had served on the court
for twelve years. He had support from both prosecutors and the
criminal defense bar. His Republican opponent campaigned in favor
of greater use of the death penalty, greater use of the harmless error
doctrine, and sanctions for attorneys who file frivolous appeals espe-
cially in death penalty cases. He had misrepresented his background,
his experience, his record, and had almost no criminal law experi-
ence. The Republican won with 54% of the vote in large part be-
cause in statewide elections, Texas has become a one-party Republi-
can state.21 The judge subsequently ran into legal difficulties related
to scalping University of Texas football game tickets and, after a
considerable period of indecisiveness, decided not to seek reelection
in 2000.
Missouri continues to have partisan judicial elections in most of
the state, although it is known for the "Missouri Plan."22 One trial
court judge there switched from the Democratic to the Republican
Party and issued a press release that included an exceptionally ugly
partisan appeal:
The truth is that I have noticed in recent years that the
Democrat party places far too much emphasis on repre-
senting minorities such as homosexuals, people who don't
want to work, and people with a skin that's any color but
white. Their reverse-discriminatory quotas and affirmative
20. See L. Douglas Kiel et al., Two-Party Competition and Trial Court
Elections in Texas, 77 JUDICATURE 290 (1994).
21. See Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence Be Attained in the
South? Overcoming History, Elections, and Misperceptions About the Role of
the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 817, 847 (1998).
22. See ABA REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON
LAWYERS' POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS PART Two, 76 n.13 (1998). As of
1997, forty of Missouri's forty-five circuits chose judges by partisan election.
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action, in the work place as well as in schools and colleges,
are repugnant to me.... I believe the time has come for us
to place much more emphasis and concern on the hard-
working taxpayers in this country.... That majority groups
of our citizens seem to have been virtually forgotten by the
Democrat party.
23
But regardless of the press release, it is the same judge with
simply a different party label.
III. PARTISAN NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS
One study of California judicial elections noted:
Even in the context of nonpartisan elections, however, vot-
ers have always been able to rely upon partisan cues re-
garding candidates for nonpartisan offices. Even if political
parties did not formally endorse candidates, voters could
look for guidance to other individuals or organizations with
recognized partisan leanings .... In addition, state and lo-
cal governmental officials with well-known political af-
filiations sometimes endorsed candidates for nonpartisan of-
fice (including judicial offices) .... In short, the practical
differences between a technically nonpartisan election and
partisan election may be more imagined or perceived than
real.24
Still, in spite of the author's belief that absent partisan cues on
the ballot the voter in California can easily obtain information about
the partisan affiliation of judicial candidates, the absence of those
ballot cues at least complicates the search for information on partisan
affiliations.
In Ohio's highly partisan supreme court elections last year, an
all out battle took place. Democratic candidates were supported by
trial lawyers and labor unions, Republicans by business interests.
Much of the spending in the race was independent spending by inter-
est groups, which means that campaigning was not restricted by the
23. Bright, supra note 21, at 850.
24. J. Clark Kelso, Judicial Elections: Practices and Trends, 11-12, at
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/judicial elecprac.htnl (last visited Feb. 21, 2001).
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Canons of Judicial Ethics25 and thus the campaigning was especially
intense and focused on the groups' political agendas.26
Michigan has nonpartisan ballots, but like Ohio, it has very par-
tisan judicial races. In the 2000 Michigan elections, the Republican
Party aired a television commercial against a Democratic nominee
for the supreme court that criticized the candidate's role in a decision
involving the sentence of a man convicted of molesting a seven-year-
old girl. The advertisement depicted the Democratic nominee as soft
on crime because he voted to uphold a reduced sentence in the case,
despite the offender's lengthy criminal history. The original script
said the candidate, then an appellate judge, "gave that repeat pedo-
phile less than the minimum sentence, just a slap on the wrist."
27
Several television station executives objected to the word "gave" be-
cause the original sentence was handed down by a trial court judge.
A revised script said the candidate "let that repeat pedophile off with
...."28 Democrats also objected to the GOP ad's mention of two
other Democratic court nominees who were not involved in the case,
though Republicans responded that there was no suggestion in the ad
that the other two candidates were involved.29 The GOP ad has de-
veloped a reputation "as one of the most brutal attacks ever launched
in a Michigan judicial campaign.
30
The Minnesota Republican Party has recently voted to endorse
candidates for the state appeals court and for the state supreme court.
25. See Alex v. County of L.A., 35 Cal. App. 3d 994, 1002, 111 Cal. Rptr.
285, 290 (1973); see also CAL. CODE JUD. ETHICs, Canon 7 (2000) ("A Judge
should not engage in political activity except to the extent necessary to obtain
or retain judicial office through the elective process.").
26. See, e.g., Spencer Hunt, Judicial Races Stretch Ethics: Ads, Agendas
Tarnishing Impartiality, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, (Sep. 24, 2000),
http://www.enquirer.com/editionsI2000/09/24I1ocjudicial races.html (report-
ing that supreme court chief justices from 15 states planned to meet to discuss
campaign reform because of intensity and misleading aspects of recent judicial
campaigns).
27. Dawson Bell, TV Ad Attacking Judge Draws Fire, DETROIT FREE
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One prominent Republican described the effort as a way to end what
he called "judicial tyranny."
31
IV. RETENTION ELECTIONS
Though the 1986 defeat of three California Supreme Court jus-
tices in retention elections are ascribed to the activities of interest
groups such as Crime Victims for Court Reform, there was also a
high level of partisan activity. Republican legislative incumbents
campaigned against the three justices, but only some Democratic in-
cumbents from safe districts supported them.32 The Republican gov-
ernor, having already announced opposition to the Democratic chief
justice because of her votes in capital cases, publicly warned the two
associate justices on the court who were also up for retention that he
would oppose their retention unless they voted to uphold more death
sentences.33 The effects of such a retention battle can fuel opposition
to other judges and, of course, it can also induce judges to pause and
consider political implications of their decisions in controversial
cases. One Democratic California justice, speaking of his vote in a
controversial 1982 decision shortly before his retention election later
commented: "I decided the case the way I saw it. But to this day, I
don't know to what extent I was subliminally motivated by the thing
you could not forget-that it might do you some good politically to
vote one way or the other.
34
In Tennessee, judges cannot run partisan races in appellate court
retention elections; but in Justice Penny White's retention election,
the Republican Party sent voters a message with the party's name
and logo saying: "If you support capital punishment, vote NO [sic]
on Penny White. 35  In early voting, the Republican governor
31. Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Reducing Injudicious-
ness in Judicial Elections, July, 2000, at http://www.brennancenter.org/
resources/resources actinjudic.html.
32. See John H. Culver & John T. Wold, Judicial Reform in California, in
JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 139, 155 (Anthony Champagne & Judith
Haydel eds., 1993).
33. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 10, at 760-61.
34. Culver & Wold, supra note 32, at 156 (quoting high court Justice Otto
Kaus).
35. Symposium, Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch: Do Rising Threats
to Judicial Independence Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases?, 31 COLUM.
1420
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commented that he had voted "no" on White's retention since she
"did not share the views of the average Tennesseean. 36 That was
followed by similar statements by both of Tennessee's Republican
senators.
37
V. THERE IS SOMETHING HAPPENING HERE;
WHAT IT IS, IS INCREASINGLY CLEAR
Partisanship in judicial elections is nothing new. Political par-
ties jockeying for power in the selection of state court judges is an
ancient political rite. After all, the main goal of the parties is to gain
and hold offices and that includes judicial offices. However, there is
a new level of partisanship in many judicial elections. It is not lim-
ited to partisan election systems, but can be found in nonpartisan
systems and in retention elections as well. Part of that new partisan-
ship may be reflected by the enhanced competitiveness of the politi-
cal parties. Certainly that is true in the South where there has been a
dramatic rise in the fortunes of the Republican Party over the past
twenty years. The result is that in the 1980s and 1990s, the sleepy
affairs that used to pass for judicial elections in the South became
pitched battles between the Democratic and Republican candidates.
It is important to note that modem partisanship in judicial elec-
tions is not limited to the party supplying workers, or funds, or even
the all-important party label to candidates. There is a viciousness, a
stridency to many modem day judicial elections that goes beyond
routine maneuvering by the parties for greater representation on the
bench. Judicial candidates are faced with hard-hitting, bitter attacks
being waged by partisans using the mass media.
The mass media is becoming the way to reach voters. No longer
can one successfully campaign for judicial office by speaking at civic
clubs, shaking hands, and garnering a few newspaper and bar en-
dorsements. One immediate effect of reaching voters in judicial
elections is that costs increase dramatically because judicial candi-
dates must advertise to reach voters through newspapers, radio, and,
HUM. RTs. L. REv. 123, 140 (1999) (quoting Penny White) [hereinafter,
Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch].
36. Id. at 139.
37. See id. at 139-40 (quoting Penny White speaking of her retention elec-
tion).
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most expensively, television. And for expensive media such as tele-
vision, the message must be brief That requires focusing on simple
themes that are attractive to voters. The result is that often the most
effective mass media advertising focuses on "hot-button" issues that
have strong voter affect.38 The late California Supreme Court Justice
Otto Kaus called these issues the "crocodiles in the bathtub. 39 They
are the issues that most judges must deal with, but which can be ef-
fectively turned against the judge in a short, simple media message.
40
Such issues are crime, capital punishment, abortion, and voter initia-
tives such as term limits.41 All it takes in this era of mass media
38. See LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, POLITICIANS DON'T
PANDER: POLITICAL MANIPULATION AND THE Loss OF DEMOCRATIC
RESPONSIVENESS 49 (2000).
39. Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Inde-
pendence of Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE
DAMEL. REv. 1133, 1133 (1997).
40. See id.
41. See id. at 1133-35; see also Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y.U. Sch. of
Law, supra note 31. Examples of these sorts of judicial campaigns are preva-
lent, and they can be found in the summaries of news reports on state judicial
elections that are available on the Brennan Center for Justice Web site. See
www.Brennancenter.org/presscenter/presscenter.html. Among recent reports
is a Cincinnati Post article reporting that an Ohio Supreme Court race is dam-
aging the public's opinion of the judiciary. Mark Kozlowski of the Brennan
Center is quoted as saying that as judicial races become TV ads and attack ads
and more like Congressional campaigns, people will become more cynical of
judges. See also Editorial, Once More, With Feeling, CINCINNATI POST, Nov.
13, 2000, available at http://www.cincypost.com/opinion/2000/edital11300
.html. Richard Grossman, a Syracuse attorney claims that judges are pledging
to be "tough on crime" in spite of rules prohibiting candidates from "making
pledges or promises of conduct in office other than impartiality." Editorial,
Impeachment and Disciplining of Judges, SYRACUSE POST, Feb. 1, 2001,
http://brennancenter.org/presscenter/presscenter.html. The Detroit Free Press
reported that a Michigan Supreme Court justice might file a libel suit over a
Democratic Party flyer distributed at a NAACP dinner that accused him of be-
lieving that the Brown decision was wrong. See Hugh McDiarmid, Flyer on
Judge Leads to Ugly Partisan Spat, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 11, 2000,
http://www.freep.com/news/politics/hughl1-000511.html. A Columbus Dis-
patch article reported that an Ohio Supreme Court candidate had hinted as to
how he would decide school funding and civil suit settlement limits. See
James Bradshaw, Court Candidate Hints at Stand on Issues, THE COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Sept. 20, 2000, at 5C. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported
that in 1998 a Supreme Court candidate ran ads claiming his opponent ap-
proved of same-sex marriages and called the electric chair "silly." The candi-
1422
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politics is for a judge to do something-almost anything-such as an
apparent low bail for a murderer or reversal of a death sentence on
appeal. A ten second media message can turn that decision into a
charge of coddling criminals that could ruin the judge's career.
42
In judicial races, the parties will often cooperate with interest
groups in presenting a message about that particular judicial cam-
paign. After all, in a race in which an interest group is, for example,
supporting a Democratic incumbent judge, the interest group is a po-
litical asset to both the incumbent judge and the Democratic Party.
Some interest groups may also develop long-term working relation-
ships with a particular political party. For example, organized labor
has traditionally been aligned with the Democratic Party, as have
trial lawyers. 43 Business groups are often aligned with the Republi-
can Party.44 In some states in recent years, the Christian Coalition
has been aligned with the Republican Party.45 The result of the long-
term intimate ties between the parties and certain interest groups is
that their goals and objectives mesh.46 In Texas, for example, it
would be difficult, though not impossible, for a candidate opposed by
trial lawyers to get the nomination of the Democratic Party for the
Texas Supreme Court. Conversely, a judicial candidate known as
date successfully sued the Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission over its
prohibition against false and misleading statements by judicial candidates. See
Bill Rankin, Election '98, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 17, 1998, at 5D; Bill Ran-
kin, Opponent Misreading View on Same-Sex Unions, ATLANTA J. CoNST.,
July 18, 1998, at http://stacks.ajc.comlcgi-bintdisplay.cgi?id=3a99b4935be8
MpqaweblP11010&doc=results.html. The Raleigh News-Observer editorial-
ized against "mudslinging and attack advertising" in judicial elections. Judi-
cial Mud, RALEIGH NEws-OBSERvER, Aug. 28, 2000, http//vww.news-
observer.com. Moreover, the St. Petersburg Times decried the transformation
of the nation's judicial elections into "bruising political battles." Editorial,
When Judicial Campaigns Go Bad, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 10, 2000, at
2D, available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.comlsptimes.
42. See Uelmen, supra note 39, at 1136-37.
43. See, e.g., Ann Devroy, Clinton Leans Left on Bias Rules: Speech Ener-
gizes Liberal Loyalists, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 20, 1995, at A22.
44. See, e.g., David Nitkin, You Can Count on State Tax Cut: Times Are
Good, So GOP Leaders Want to Give You a Break But Should Florida Be
Saving Instead?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 1, 1999, at Al.
45. See, e.g., Kurt Erickson, Christian Coalition Chairman Seeks Biparti-
sanship, THE PANTAGRAPH, June 21, 2000, at A3.
46. JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 44-54 (3d ed.
1997).
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having pro-choice views would have trouble getting the Republican
nomination. In fact, two Republican judges on a Texas intermediate
appellate court were recently rebuked by delegates at the Republican
State Convention because of their decision to overturn a sodomy
conviction. This action angered religious conservatives in the
party.47 Although the judges are Republicans, the delegates opposed
their reelection and placed language in the party platform attacking
"activist judges who use their power to usurp the will of the peo-
ple."48 Thus, interest group politics in the states affect party politics
that in turn have an influence on who becomes a judge. Those inter-
est groups with influence in the party are going to want their party's
candidate to be sympathetic to their objectives, and, to get their sup-
port, the judicial candidate is going to have to show that he or she is
friendly to the goals of the group.
Where the interest groups' goals become one party's goals and
the opposing interest groups' goals become those of the opposing
party, the stage is set for the strident, bitter judicial election cam-
paigns that have been seen in numerous states such as Texas, Ala-
bama, Michigan, and Ohio. There is little room for moderation in
races that pit labor-backed Democrats against business-backed Re-
publicans; trial lawyer-supported Democrats against physician-
supported Republicans or pro-life Republicans against pro-choice
Democrats. An example of such a tie between interest groups, po-
litical parties, and the judiciary is suggested by a string of decisions
by the Cook County, Illinois judiciary in 1996 that declared parts of
the 1995 Illinois tort reform law unconstitutional.49 Cook County's
bench was a bastion for Democrats, and both the judges and the party
were strongly backed by trial lawyers whose goals were contrary to
the Republican legislature's efforts for tort reform.50
The parties have also become more ideologically separate in
America. One study of the political feelings of voters shows that
47. See Julie Mason, Bizarre Double Standard Permeates State GOP Con-
vention, THE HOUsTON CHRON., June 25, 2000, at A32.
48. People for the American Way, Right-Wing Attacks on Judicial Inde-
pendence in the States in 2000, Sept. 25, 2000 at 5, available at http://www.
pfaw.org/issues/right/rwwo/rwwo.000925.shtml.
49. See Williams, supra note 14, at 313-14.
50. See id.
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while the general public's feelings about "liberals" and "conserva-
fives" has remained fairly stable from 1964 to 1994 with a slightly
more favorable response to "conservatives," Democratic Party and
Republican Party partisans were quite different.5 Strong partisans
make up about one-third of the electorate and are most likely to vote
and to participate in party activities. Strong Republicans tend to
have much more favorable feelings toward "conservatives," and
strong Democrats have much more favorable feelings toward "liber-
als."
52
These long-term trends have several important implications for
judicial races. The greater ideological divide among the parties sug-
gests that campaigns between the competing parties, including judi-
cial campaigns, will be more bitter and hard fought. Further, issues
that are ideological "hot buttons" will prove increasingly effective in
mobilizing the activists of both parties. Since judicial candidates
must find ways to mobilize the strong partisans of their respective
parties to succeed in elections, some candidates will approach the
line, and possibly cross the line, of unethical political appeals. If the
Christian Coalition is important to the party, what better way of
building a strong base of support in the party than doing an act such
as posting the "Ten Commandments" in the courtroom?53 If prose-
cutors and victims' rights groups are powerful in another county's
politics, an effective way of building support might be to act as one
judge did when he taped a picture of Judge Roy Bean's hanging sa-
loon on the front of his bench with his name superimposed over
Judge Bean's and referred to the high court's judges as "liberal bas-
tards" and "idiots." 54 Logically, these, and numerous other examples
of grandstanding and political rhetoric, can generate publicity and
support and, thus, aid a party's nomination and election of its candi-
date.
VI. CONCLUSION
The role of political parties in judicial elections has long been
criticized and reforms such as nonpartisan elections and retention
51. See JACOBS & SHAPIRO, supra note 38, at 35.
52. See id.
53. See Bright, supra note 21, at 833.
54. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 10, at 813.
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elections were designed to restrict the influence of the parties. Nev-
ertheless, political parties retain a major role in all judicial elections.
However, that role is not all bad. The parties do perform valuable
functions in judicial elections, such as providing campaign workers,
funds, and the party label to judicial candidates. No doubt it is the
utility of the parties in these elections that explains the persistence of
parties even in the face of anti-party reforms.
However, parties do have negative effects in judicial races.
These effects are especially noticeable when highly qualified judges
are defeated simply because they had the wrong party label in a year
when a presidential nominee of the opposing party was unusually
popular-hence, Judge Williams' explanation of his defeat eighty
years ago in connection with the Warren Harding landslide.
55
There appears to be a new level of partisanship in many judicial
races. One explanation for this greater and more vicious partisanship
is that the parties in some states have become more competitive. In
the South, that competitiveness has come about in the past two dec-
ades as the Republican Party has become a major force in the re-
gion.56 Another explanation for the new partisanship is the increased
reliance on mass media for campaigning in judicial races. The nature
of mass media campaigns is to attempt to saturate the media market
with a simple message. For judicial races, that means that a success-
ful media strategy is to use "attack ads" to focus on "hot-button" is-
sues such as capital punishment, abortion, or crime.
Additionally, the parties in some states are closely aligned with
competing interest groups. That entanglement of parties and interest
groups leads the parties to adopt the groups' goals as their own. The
result is a wider gulf between viewpoints of the two parties and the
candidates of those parties. Since neither the independent expendi-
tures of the parties nor their interest group allies are restricted by
ethical constraints, their use of "hot-button" issues in the media can
be particularly strident.
55. See Warren G. Harding, Twenty-Ninth President 1921-1923, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/wh29.html (last visited Mar. 15,
2001). In 1920, Harding received 60.4% of the popular vote to Democrat
James Cox's 34.2%.
56. See Drennan, Judicial Reform, supra note 17, at 184-85.
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Finally, there are increasing ideological differences between
strong partisans of the two parties. The greater the gulf between the
third of the population who are the most likely party activists and the
most likely voters, the more ideologically extreme will campaigns
become-including judicial campaigns. Moreover, more judicial
candidates vill be inclined to adopt ideologically extreme positions
to appeal to the strong partisans and the interest groups allied with
that party.
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